Economic
Journal of Hokkaido University,
vol.29, 2000
This paper examines the status of the methodology of social
sciences in the light of ideological debate between capitalism and socialism.
The spirit of scientism was shared by both scientific socialism, which was
raised by Engels, and scientific liberalism, which was raised by Popper, Mises
and Hayek. In the age of scientism, issues of social science methodology were
placed as final stage for the ideological battle over the institutional choice
problem. But if we examine critically, scientific liberalism has not only lost
its opponent with the decline of socialism, but has also been broken down
through immanent criticism. Liberalism could not be justified by any scientific
methodology.
1.
Science
as the “Spirit of Problem-Consciousness”
From the late nineteenth century to the late
twentieth century, there exists one concept that every discipline studying
society must confront: “science.”
The following questions show the many kinds of considerations
surrounding this concept, in regard to the appropriate method to reach true
scientific knowledge:
Is dialectics or positivism the proper method of
understanding?
What is the difference between the natural
sciences and the sciences that study society and culture?
What is the proper criterion for demarcating the
boundary between science and metaphysics (or ideology, myth, magic, art)?
What kind of human influences are there on
scientific research activity?
Are there influences such as those of a
Weltanschauung, life-world, life (soe), Dasein, value-interest, sympathy, and so on?
How is a new field of research up-graded to
become a “science”: does it become a science because it has become a paradigm
or has an advanced research program?
What is the scientific way for evaluating
theories properly?
Is the growth of scientific knowledge rational
or relativistic?
The idea of “science” has been examined in
various contexts, and it has been discussed as a central issue of our age
during the past hundred years. So
it is possible to say that we will find the spirit of our age in this idea. That spirit, however, is not like the Zeit-Geist, which is presupposed by a Hegelian or Diltheyan approach. Rather, this spirit is embodied in a
realm where people, who do not share common values, but share common key
problems, and criticize each other’s contributions to the growth of
knowledge. This spirit seems to be
the main device of our age and also be the foundation of all reasonable
debate. I would like to call it the
spirit of “problem-consciousness”.
In my opinion, the idea of science has been the main
problem-consciousness of our age for the past hundred years.
It is important that we regard the span of our
age as approximately a hundred years.
If we followed the popular history of social ideas, our age would still
be the age of the enlightenment that began with Rene Descartes. Our problem-consciousness would thus
concern the concept of “enlightenment”, which has continued from the sixteenth
century. It is true that our idea
of the “enlightenment” is not complete, no matter how we have changed our
concept of enlightenment and no matter how skeptical we have become of the age
of enlightenment (post-modern skepticism).
Michael Foucault (1966) argues that there is a deep gap between
classicism in the eighteenth century and the era of science after the
nineteenth century. He insists that
the common ancestor of our age is not Descartes. Others have also criticized the
interpretation of our age that has equated modernity with the eighteenth
century enlightenment.
These interpretations of how to constitute our
historical period differ according to the value-interests we have. The popular interpretations of our
modernity, however, do not focus on the intellectual history that we have
experienced over approximately the last hundred years, which has been the
history of a raging debate between capitalism and socialism. This debate has been the most important
issue in the intellectual history of modern economic thought. If we focus on the intellectual
background of socialism, we can trace it back to Thomas More’s
Utopia in the sixteenth century. But it is in the latter half of the
nineteenth century that the socialist movement actually became a powerful force
in society and come to occupy the interests of social philosophers. The idea of ‘scientific socialism’ has been
persuasive and successful, and has become the origin of our
problem-consciousness over the last hundred years.
It should be noted that Karl Marx was not the person who set forth scientific socialism, at the beginning of our age one hundred years ago. Let us look more into the concept of “science”. The word “science” can be traced back to the Latin word “scientia”, which was used to mean “knowledge”, as distinguished from “opinion” (doxa), until the beginning of the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth century the word science came to have another meaning, which was theoretical knowledge, as opposed to practical knowledge. But until that time the words “science” and “philosophy” were used interchangeably. Thus Adam Smith, who is regarded as the founder of the social sciences, was called a “moral philosopher”.
In the middle of the nineteenth century the word
“scientist” first appeared in history.
In the nineteenth century “science” came to have a new meaning, that of
experimental knowledge in the broader sense. In this sense it meant the systematic and methodological observation
of certain things, and it was distinguished from metaphysics and theology. So when Karl Marx uses the word science,
he often means just theoretical knowledge based on systematic and
methodological observation. For
example, in Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie, Marx regarded the “upward method” as
scientifically correct. This method
meant roughly that we begin to search from abstract and simple concepts and end
by describing concrete concepts in a systematic way. By this definition science is a certain
systematic development of knowledge.
In the postscript to the second edition of Das Kapital, Marx says that classical
economics before him was scientific in the sense that it expanded the
experimental inquiry of knowledge and met the changing demands of the social
stages of development of its time.
So when Marx uses the word “science” he is using the word in the
accepted meaning it had in his time, that of being experimental knowledge. As far as the definition of “science” is
concerned, we should distinguish between Marx and later Marxist theorists.
With Friedrich Engels “science” came to have
another significant meaning, and the movement of “scientific” socialism has
begun. In his Anti-Duhring (Hern Eugen Umwalzung der Wissenschaft 1877-78),
Engels made his original distinction between metaphysics and science. Metaphysics is a method that regards any
object as permanent, unchanging, or lacking any relation to other objects. On the other hand, Engels held that science
means the dialectical method.
Science conceives an object in its motion, growth, and ceasing to be,
and in its relation to other objects.
If we accept Engels’ distinction, it follows that classical economics is
metaphysics and Marx’s economics is science.
According to Engels, socialism became scientific
because Marx made materialism a science and unmasked the enigma of surplus
value production in capitalism. So
Engels insisted that Marx and Engels’ socialism was the only one that could be
scientific. Following this, we can
find an additional meaning to the word “science”: the distinction between science and
non-science within methodological and systematic theoretical knowledge comes to
a distinction between correct knowledge (science) and incorrect knowledge
(non-science).
It should also be noted that Engels implies by
this distinction that “correct scientific knowledge leads us to correct thought
and ideas” or “correct scientific knowledge is the same as correct thought and
ideas.” After Engels the meaning of
“science” become a very controversial topic, concomitant with the emergence of
ideological problems between socialism and capitalism. Any statement such as “Marxism is
science” or “The idea of Socialism has advanced to the stage of science” is not
only a cognitive problem, but also becomes an ideological problem. So the situation came about that those
in the opposite ideological camp sought to respond to this problem by examining
the concept of “science” seriously, as a result of the Marxists’ claims to
scientific correctness. Thus, we can say that after Engels the debate on
capitalism and socialism came to center on the concept of “science”. So we should regard Engels as the
founder of the “problem-consciousness” of our age.
To avoid misunderstanding, we should add that
Engels did not argue that the economics of Marx was the only one truth of the
social sciences. The contrary is
the case: Engels was a historical
relativist. He believed that truth
changed according to each stage of history. So even if his idea of socialism had
many difficulties, it can be regarded as scientific truth only in his
historical period.
After Engels, however, various attempts to
describe scientifically the future development of socialism unfolded in many
directions. Attempts to conceive
the development to socialism from certain scientific points of view were seen
in orthodox Marxism, Oskar Lange’s market socialism,
Otto Neurath’s logical positivism, Schumpeter’s economic theory, and the Uno
Kouzo school of Marxist theory in Japan. On the other hand, attempts to conceive
the development to socialism negatively from other scientific points of view
were seen in the writings of Sir Karl Popper, Ludwig von Mises,
and Friedrich von Hayek, whom we have examined
critically (Hashimoto 1994).
Furthermore, attempts to set the problem in a different way and avoid a
radical choice between capitalism and socialism were seen in the writings of
Karl Polanyi, Frank Knight, and Gunnar
Myrdal.
In these attempts by social thinkers the word “science”
has got great significance in many points.
It constituted a significant constellation of problems in which the
fundamental problem of choosing between capitalism and socialism was laid out
as the basic issue, and other problems were transformed and defined more
clearly in the light of this basic issue.
In the context of political economy this basic issue has been
transformed into the problem of the proper mix of state planning and free market
activity in a welfare state economy.
In the context of the methodology of the social sciences this basic
issue has been transformed, for example, into Max Weber’s Wertfreiheit problem concerning objective argumentation in social and economic
theory.
Another example of an important problem arising
from the basic issues of the meaning of “science” and the choice between
capitalism and socialism was that of the methodological differences between the
natural and social sciences. These differences became important because
examination of them contributed to understanding the extent to which the
methodology of the natural sciences was effective in legitimizing the idea of “scientific”
socialism. For philosophers such as
Otto Neurath, Karl Popper and Imre
Lakatos, the problem of demarcation between the sciences
and metaphysics and the problem of the growth of scientific knowledge became
important. For Neurath, Popper and Lakatos these problems mattered because examination of them
contributed to the study of the problem of whether Marxist economics could be
recognized as a science.
Finally, another problem that arose from the
basic issues of the meaning of “science” and the choice between capitalism and
socialism concerned critical examination of “scientific” activity. Critical examination of “scientific” activity
appeared in studies of themes such as “science and the autonomous subjectivity
of man” and “scientism and subjectivist reasoning”. We can regard these themes as arising or
branching out from the basic issue of the choice between capitalism and socialism
because they are closely related to human activity in the market economy and to
the movement for “scientific” socialism.
Even the Life-World theory of Berger, Luckmann,
and Schütz, which seemed to be ideologically neutral,
had to make a meaning-world and contrast this world with the world of physical
cause and effect, which adherents to scientific ideology purported to
investigate. In fact, Alfred Schütz specifically intended the construction of his
phenomenological sociology to provide theoretical and ideological support to
the methodology of the Austrian School, especially as developed by Mises (Hashimoto 1995).
From these considerations we can understand that
“science” matters in our age because we must solve scientifically the
fundamental problem of choice between capitalism and socialism. Our problem-consciousness, in engagement
with the social sciences, derives from this issue. Popper, Mises
and Hayek have examined the problem which Engels
originally set forth, and they have contested his scientific socialism in the
context of the philosophy of the social sciences. We can use the term “scientific”
liberalism to refer to the theory of these three thinkers, in contrast to the
theory of “scientific” socialism. These thinkers are “scientific” because they
have criticized socialism and defended capitalism from a scientific point of
view. As with Marxian theorists
after Engels, these three liberal thinkers made the idea of “science” central
in their discussion. To pursue the
argument to its logical conclusion, scientific liberalism dared to meet the “scientific”
socialists on their own ground. It took “science” as the criterion for making
the fundamental choice between capitalist and socialist institutions. The combative ring with which these three
thinkers discussed this issue came from their recognition that they were
tackling this issue according to the rules of “science”, a criterion originally
set by their opponents. They
recognized that the more scientific their arguments were, the more valid these
arguments would be in persuading others.
2.
The Development of Scientific Liberalism
The development of scientific liberalism must be
described in the context of the history of Vienna, especially in the period of
the Habsburg Empire. Karl Popper
(1902-1994), Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973), and
Friedrich von Hayek (1899-1992) were all born and
grew up in Vienna at the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the
twentieth century. In Vienna during
this period there was an atmosphere of anti-Prussianism
and anti-Protestantism because of opposition to the school of German idealism
from Kant to Hegel. The reform of
the gymnasium by the Herbart School led to an
educational program in Vienna that succeeded in creating an original
intellectual culture. At the time
people from many different nationalities lived together in Vienna, and its
cosmopolitan citizens looked on the outside world in terms of universal,
progressive ideals.
On the other hand, Vienna was also a
conservative city, and its people, faced with the decline of the Habsburg
Empire, were nostalgic for the culture of the days of city’s former
greatness. These circumstances have
kept Viennese intellectuals away from the dynamism of Hegelian and Marxist
dialectics and also from any association with Nietzsche’s philosophy. In contrast to German intellectuals,
they wanted classical Greek thought to keep its traditional predominance in
learning, and at the same time they were attracted to recent English
philosophy. So we should understand
the development of scientific liberalism in Vienna in the light of this
historical background, in which the intelligentsia opposed the German idealism
that offered intellectual support to Marxism.
In fin de siècle Vienna, there were many
fascinating intellectuals who were critical successors to the systematic
philosophy of Herbart. In economics there were the members of
the Austrian School of Economics, which originated with Carl Menger. The
line of thinkers in this school ran from Menger to Böhm-Bawerk, Friedrich Wieser,
Ludwig von Mises, and Friedrich Hayek. Another prominent school was that of
Austro-Marxism, which originated with Alfred Adler, who was followed by Otto
Bauer and Abba Lenner and others such as Joseph Schumpeter, Rudolf Hilferding,
and Karl Polanyi. In philosophy important thinkers were Lujo Brentano, Ernst Mach, Karl Popper, Ludwig
Wittgenstein, and several logical positivists. Other important intellectual schools
were those of Hans Kelsen’s legal positivism, Eugen Ehrlich’s sociology of law, Sigmund Freud’s
psychoanalysis, and Alfred Schütz’s phenomenological
sociology. All of these schools
originated in Vienna at the turn of the century and have formed the basic
foundations of the contemporary social sciences.
Because these thinkers lived in the same city,
there must have been private and close relationships among them. We can see examples of such
relationships among the thinkers who developed scientific liberalism. For example, Karl Popper had close
relationships with Karl Menger, a son of Carl Menger, and Richard von Mises, a
brother of Ludwig von Mises. F.A. Hayek and
Alfred Schütz were close friends, and they conducted
a private seminar named “Geisteskreis” together. They also participated in Ludwig von Mises’ seminar, which was held at the Vienna Chamber of
Commerce and Industry from 1922 to 1934. Ludwig von Mises
was born in the same year as Hans Kelsen, and they
went to elementary school together.
Hayek and Wittgenstein were related as second
cousins. When Hayek
was a professor at the London School of Economics (LSE), he invited Popper, who
had gone to teach in New Zealand, to come to LSE as a professor. After that relations between Popper and Hayek became closer; however, the relationship between
Popper and Wittgenstein deteriorated after they quarreled during a discussion
they had.
The rich and varied intellectual development of
Vienna at the turn of the century was made possible by the close and sometimes
conflicting relationships between members of the intellectual community, as
described above. This intellectual
community, however, collapsed after World War I, because of anti-Semitism,
hyperinflation that bankrupted the economy, and finally the Nazi invasion of
Vienna in 1938. Popper went to New
Zealand in 1937, Hayek went to London in 1938, and Mises, who was on the blacklist of the Nazis and the
Soviets, went to Geneva in 1934 and to New York in 1940. When the Nazis invaded Vienna, they
confiscated all of Mises’ books and documents.
However, these three thinkers, Popper, Mises, and Hayek, were used to be
socialists when they were young. So
they have become extremely conscious of and sensitive to the persuasive power
of socialist ideology. Mises was pro-socialist when he was an undergraduate and
studied history, such as the German historical school, under Karl Grünberg.
However, he became a liberal after reading Carl Menger’s
Gründsatze
in 1903. As an undergraduate Hayek participated in Fabian association activities. At that time he studied under Wieser and avoided Mises. However, he became a liberal after
reading Mises’ Socialism,
which was published in 1922. Popper
has been a socialist when he was in junior high school, and in 1919 he was a
communist for a few months. But
when he was seventeen, he turned against Marxism.
These personal experiences of socialism
determined Mises’, Hayek’s
and Popper’s later thinking and speculation. They must have asked questions such as:
why does a fascinating idea such as socialism lead to the collapse of society
as an unintended consequence? For Mises and Hayek the important
problem was that any socialist ideal would never succeed as an actual economic
policy for improving the situation in Vienna at that time. For Popper the key problem was that the
class struggles called for by socialist thought would not bring peace. He actually witnessed the political
accident of the social democrats’ threatening to use force on people.
In addition, these thinkers also asked why the
idea of scientific socialism and economic collectivism fascinated many
intellectuals. They focused on the
problem that the statement “Marxism is a science” means that only the socialist
ideal is true beyond any criticism.
Because the Nazi invasion forced them to get away from their own
country, I think that they came to hope earnestly that a liberal society would
be realized. These three thinkers
started the radical criticism of all forms of socialism, including Marxism, as “enemies
of an open society”. This
background thus forms the historical context for the debate between scientific
socialism and scientific liberalism.
3.
How We Should Conceive the Intellectual
History of the Capitalism/Socialism Debate
The main issue in the debate over the
institutional choice problem between capitalism and socialism was not formed
easily. Although those who engaged
in this debate thought that they had to answer this problem scientifically,
there was no clear definition of the concept of “science”. So at the beginning of the debate they
had to answer the question about how to define science or a scientific
statement. With this definition one could ascertain whether any proposed
statement was scientific or not.
Socialist thinkers have claimed: “socialism is
science.” Liberal thinkers,
however, criticized this statement by saying “Your conception of science is
false.” Socialist thinkers made the
same claim and criticism of liberal thinkers. Thus the main issue of the debate over
the choice between capitalism and socialism moved to a higher level. The main issue became that of the
methodology of the social sciences. In regard to this issue, the definition of
science became a matter of philosophical importance.
We should note that in this methodological
debate participants were not purely investigating academic truth. Rather, they were fighting on an
ideological issue in which each side sought to use its reason and intellectual
powers as much as possible.
Moreover, they were not looking for methodological devices that would
make it possible to examine contested points objectively. The issue of methodology became the
final stage for the ideological battle over the institutional choice
problem.
As a result of this development, liberal
thinkers such as Popper, Mises and Hayek had to take the methodology of the social sciences
seriously when they struggled over ideological matters. We can understand this situation from
the fact that they did not deduce or develop their social theory directly from
their methodological tenets. In the
methodology of the social sciences, the main problem was to decide the
institutional choice problem between capitalism and socialism correctly. In this decision the claim that one’s
statements were scientific had great value. So we can say that the debate over
methodology was not a general, disinterested discussion of the foundations of
social theory. Rather, it was a
continuation on a higher level of the ideological debate over capitalism and
socialism.
In this situation, then, what course did the
debate follow? We can suppose two
possibilities.
One supposition would be the triumph of
scientific liberalism. In this
case, liberalism presented the most persuasive conception of science and
provided the best solution to the institutional choice problem between
socialism and capitalism. This
interpretation of the history of the debate, however, is something we
deny. As we examined critically in
another paper (Hashimoto 1994), the “scientific” way which scientific
liberalism has taken can no longer withstand criticism.
Another supposition would be that the debate on
the definition of science has moved to another stage because discussion of this
problem was fruitful and those engaged in the debate were on different
wavelengths. But this interpretation
is also false because the debate was not fruitful and on many points the
participants were on the same wavelength.
Here we can find a major theme in our reconstructing the intellectual
history of the socialism/capitalism debate. The debate did not end because
either side triumphed or because both sides saw the debate as unfertile. If so, then how did the debate come to
an end?
If we look at the debate from the outside, we
can see that the methodological debate came to an end because the political
confrontation between socialism and capitalism no longer exists in our
time. This view is partly correct
in so far as it points out the external causes of intellectual history. However, if take all causes of intellectual
history as external, then we would be obliged to take a relativist
position. This position would be
that “external causes determine the horizon of argumentation of intellectual
history”. This position would be
one in which knowledge changes due to irrational and non-intellectual
reasons. It is true that a
relativist position is correct in so far as one argues that the themes of
intellectual inquiry will change according to the political and economic
demands of the time. But we are
mistaken if we argue that there is thus no reason for changing and developing
the themes of intellectual inquiry on the basis of internally rational
causes. We must look at the logical
adequacy of arguments that arise in intellectual history. We must also criticize these
arguments from the standpoint of moral reasoning. To maintain our ability to reason
rationally is one of the most important conditions for mankind to live together
peacefully. Even Thomas Kuhn, as we
find in his later works, did not take an extremely relativist stance.
If we define the idea of “rationality”
adequately, we can describe intellectual history as the rationally progressive
growth of knowledge. Admittedly, it
is an open question whether knowledge has progressed rationally or not.
However, history is always constructed ex
post facto, and it is actually possible for the historian to generate a “past”
at the time he is writing. Let us
suppose a person who is reconstructing the past sees some lack of rationality
in the intellectual history he is interested in. In such a case, I think he should add a
rational reconstruction of this history from his perspective.
My ideal historian is one who serves also recent
thought (ideology) by constructing history from his value-laden
perspective. Anyone who writes
history needs to be aware that he is already engaged in a political conflict
for historical legitimization in a broad sense. Thus we should deal with this kind of
conflict in as rational manner as possible. We should hope to strengthen the pressure
for rationally selecting knowledge in the light of the growth of
knowledge. That is, knowledge must
be selected through rational criticism and must be preserved by rational
reason. To present a rational
criticism must be established as one of good manners in intellectual discourse;
an attitude of choosing knowledge rationally based on adequate criticism.
With these thoughts in mind, I would like to
make a radical reconstruction of our intellectual history, in which knowledge
is received and rejected through rational reasoning, i.e., through internal
causes, based on intellectual consistency.
The concept of science transformed the institutional choice problem
between capitalism and socialism from a realm in which this problem was a
persuasion game centering on the concept “science” to a realm in which the
concept itself was most important.
But after a while this realm of discussion has almost disappeared. External causes, such as the emergence
of welfare states and the fall of socialist states, are one reason for the
disappearance of this realm of discussion.
But internal causes, which will be given through constructing a
critically rational process of intellectual history, also explain this
disappearance. My hypothesis, which
I develop in my Logic of Liberty: Popper,
Mises, and Hayek
(Hashimoto 1994), is that we can no longer argue on political thinking within
the realm of a methodology of the social sciences. Internal criticism shows that
methodological statements in social sciences can no longer lade any ideological
elements.
4.
The Turning Point of the Social Sciences
Here we would like to draw attention to the
recent academic situation that has emerged after the process described above,
of extracting the value-laden elements out of methodological statements.
Scientific liberalism has already become a relic
of the past. As I examined in
another paper, scientific liberalism has not only lost its opponent with the
decline of socialism. It has also
been broken down through immanent criticism. It is true that the Japanese Communist
Party, for example, still upholds the ideal of scientific socialism. However, most modern philosophers, who
support liberalism, do not share its problem-consciousness, which concerns the
concept of “science.” They seem to
think that their opponent, scientific socialism, has already declined.
If the debate that sought to shed light on the
concept of “science” is no longer fruitful, then the methodology of the social
sciences needs to change its direction.
For this methodology has been argued over in terms of the concept of “science”. When we cease to argue matters in terms
of ideological interests in the search for scientific truth, the most important
part of methodological inquiry, as it concerns the social sciences, will lose
its significance. In retrospect,
the conditions for paying serious attention to the methodology of the social
sciences were ones that came about under pressure of settling an ideological
struggle by means of rational procedures.
Today this ideological pressure has weakened. So
it is necessary to change the tasks of methodology and social philosophy to
other directions. On the other
hand, however, I think that methodological investigations that are unconcerned
with thought or ideology are often sterile. Recent methodological research has been
liable to a pedantic intellectualism.
The more exact methodological refinement becomes, the less is its
significance for the growth of scientific knowledge. The methodological investigation of the
social sciences is now at a turning point.
Over the past hundred years the methodology of the
social sciences has been the final resort in the ideological controversy
between capitalism and socialism.
In fact, social science methodology, which examines scientific truth for
ideology, has played an important role in the problem of the final choice
between these two institutions.
Our problem, however, is not this kind of
radical choice. As we have de-coupled the value-laden elements from its
methodology, the former significance of methodology has been lost. On the other hand, we can now discuss ideology
separate from methodology.
Therefore, it is possible for us to turn back to the legacy of the “moral
sciences” before Engels, and to reconstruct our research program for science
and thought. We would have to start
from both of our legacies, from before and after Engels. We need to see clearly the gap between
the two lines of intellectual development.
Through these investigations, we will learn about the various ways of
legitimizing the idea of liberty, and we will be able to elaborate our ideas on
liberalism and an open society.
Since our final concern is with ideological discourse on the ideal of a
future society, we do not want to finish our investigation at the point of the “end
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